Where Did the Resistance Go, You Silly People?

In 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘧, Curtis explicitly argues that Bernays’ techniques were adopted by governments and corporations to manage, pacify, and steer the public in mass democracies, making them more predictable and easier to govern. He does not frame it as a single conspiratorial “purpose,” but as a systemic shift in how power relates to the public. On the subject of conspiracy, I'm more aligned with SDS founder Carl Oglesby: "of course they will; why wouldn't they?"

Curtis opens the series by saying it is about “how those in power have used Freud’s theories to try and control the dangerous crowd in an age of mass democracy.” He shows Bernays pioneering techniques that shape desires, engineer consent, and redirect unconscious impulses toward consumption and political compliance. He argues that these methods were embraced because they made populations more governable by channeling their irrational drives into consumerism rather than political action. He presents this not as a secret plot but as a technocratic solution to elite fears about mass democracy.

Curtis’s argument is not that Bernays was hired to “control society” in a cartoonish sense. Instead Bernays’ methods create a public that is focused on personal satisfaction, distracted by consumer identity  (and now other kinds), which makes the crowd less likely to mobilize politically. The Koch Cabal worked the other side of the street because, again, why wouldn't it? Money and power as pursued by a rival faction. But it's the Great Sellout that has made it impossible to resist Trump. The Dems are their own victims of this technique.

This is ancient. By shaping desires, elites can  stabilize markets (the prime directive of the Dems), - stabilize political behavior, and avoid mass unrest in spite of the fact that such unrest is a natural consequence of institutional failure in meeting real human needs.

Curtis argues that the rise of the “self” — curated, expressive, consumerist — becomes a mechanism of governance. People feel free while being subtly steered. It hinges on vain self-regard.

So does Curtis claim Bernays was used to make the public easier to control? Yes — Curtis’s thesis is that Bernays’ techniques were adopted precisely because they made the public more manageable, predictable, and governable. The irrational hyperactivism stirred up by the plateauing s-curve of the gold standard frightened these Anglo-Americans especially after it blew up into WW I. Hell, I would have been scared, too, but the Yuppy Excrescence gave me a moral panic, too. To his credit, Curtis also frames this as a structural response to elite anxieties, not a single coordinated conspiracy but a long-term shift in how power operates in democracies. Think of it as part of Anglo-America's political subculture (Macauley, Ruskin). Control? Manipulation? What's the difference? It's an ancient method updated by modern science. 

I'm only too happy, even eager, to give my own opinion about specific political figures or issues. But this leads to laziness. This is about more than a devil or villain theory of history. That outlook leaves you in the dupe-zone, and I want the American public out of it. I believe Americans ought to learn how to think like a graduate of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service or WAIP (when its students were less obsessed with social climbing and career advancement like those fish-eyed p'tit-boos who managed to pass the SAT but never absorbed the public spiritedness). 

What I can and will do (and want to) is analyze the patterns people point to, the structural explanations scholars and commentators offer, and how those ideas intersect with the themes I've explored — especially Curtis’s argument about managed publics. The trained incapacity of modern voters is horrific. It cannot organize, at all, and this needs to be addressed.

If Curtis argues that modern societies use psychological and consumer‑driven mechanisms to pacify the public, is it possible that these same mechanisms weakened or blunted resistance to Trump? This is a legitimate analytical question, and many writers, sociologists, and political theorists have explored versions of it. Here’s how that ever-lovin' ideal the consensus is unfolding.

Curtis’s thesis (as commentators summarize it) is that:

- Modern democracies increasingly rely on individualized selfhood, consumer identity, and therapeutic language to manage public emotions.

- These mechanisms can redirect collective anxiety away from political action and toward personal lifestyle choices.

- This used to be called atomization before we got mealy-mouthed.

- The result is a public that feels expressive but is less organized, less cohesive, and less confrontational.

This is not framed as a conspiracy — more as a structural drift in how power operates.

Many political theorists — not Curtis himself, but people drawing on similar frameworks — argue that individualization weakens collective action. When politics becomes a matter of personal branding, lifestyle, or identity expression, movements can fragment into:

- micro‑communities  

- affinity groups  

- therapeutic discourses  

- online performance  

This can make sustained, coordinated resistance harder.

Consumer culture absorbs dissent. Some scholars argue that outrage becomes:

- content  

- merchandise  

- social media performance  

- personal catharsis  

rather than organized political pressure.

Emotional management replaces structural critique. A common argument is that people are encouraged to:

- “work on themselves”  

- “manage their stress”  

- “curate their feeds”  

instead of confronting institutions.

This is very much in the spirit of Curtis’s analysis.

Writers across the political spectrum have suggested that resistance to various political figures — including Trump — has sometimes been shaped by fragmentation. Coalitions splinter into:

- moral purity debates  

- identity‑based disagreements  

- tactical disputes  

- online conflicts  

Symbolic action replaces material action. Examples often cited include:

- hashtags  

- viral content  

- symbolic gestures  

- personal statements  

These can create a sense of participation without building durable power.

This favors emotional catharsis over strategy. Some analysts argue that outrage can become:

- a coping mechanism  

- a form of identity  

- a substitute for organizing  

rather than a means of achieving political outcomes.

Many scholars argue that the dynamics Curtis describes — individualization, consumer identity, emotional management, and the redirection of collective energy into personal expression — can weaken political resistance in general. This is not about any one politician. It’s about the structure of modern democratic societies.

From this perspective, it is possible to interpret the difficulties of resisting any powerful political figure through the lens Curtis provides.

A more interesting question is if Curtis is right that modern societies channel political energy into individualized, therapeutic, or consumerist forms…

What would a form of resistance look like that escapes those channels? This is where the real intellectual adventure begins.